Abstract. In the white-box attack context, i.e., the setting where an implementation of a cryptographic algorithm is executed on an untrusted platform, the adversary has full access to the implementation and its execution environment. 
Introduction
A white-box environment is an environment in which an adversary has complete access to an implementation of a cryptographic algorithm and its execution environment. In a white-box environment, the adversary is much more powerful than in a traditional black-box environment in which the adversary has only access to the inputs and outputs of a cryptographic algorithm. For example, in a white-box environment the adversary can: (1) trace every program instruction of the implementation, (2) view the contents of memory and cache, including secret data, (3) stop execution at any point and run an off-line process, and/or (4) alter code or memory contents at will. To this end, the adversary can make use of widely available tools such as disassemblers and debuggers.
cipher mapping a 16 byte plaintext to a 16 byte ciphertext using a 128 bit key. AES-128 consists of 10 rounds and has 11 round keys which are derived from the AES-128 key using the AES key scheduling algorithm. Each round of the algorithm updates a 16 byte state; the initial state of the algorithm is the plaintext and the final state of the algorithm is the ciphertext. In the following, a state is denoted by [state i ] i=0,1,...,15 . A round comprises the following operations:
-ShiftRows is a permutation on the indices of the bytes of the state. It is defined by the permutation (0, 5, 10, 15, 4, 9, 14, 3, 8, 13, 2, 7, 12, 1, 6, 11), i.e. the first byte of the output of ShiftRows is the first byte of the input, the second byte of the output is the fifth byte of the input, and so on. -AddRoundKey is a bitwise addition modulo two of a 128 bit round key k r (1 ≤ r ≤ 11) and the state.
-SubBytes applies the AES S-box operation to every byte of the state. AES uses one fixed S-box, denoted by S, which is a non-linear, bijective mapping from 8 bits to 8 bits -MixColumns is a linear operation over GF 2 8 operating on 4 bytes of the state at a time. The MixColumns operation can be represented by a 4 × 4 matrix MC over GF 2 8 . To update the state, 4 consecutive bytes of the state are interpreted as a vector over GF 2 8 and multiplied by MC. Using the notation and the representation of the finite field as in [ There are several equivalent ways to describe AES-128. The following description of AES-128 is the one used in this paper, wherek r for 1 ≤ r ≤ 10 is the result of applying ShiftRows to k r : 
The White-Box AES Implementation
This section describes the white-box AES implementation proposed in [10] . As the MixColumns operation is omitted in the final AES-128 round, the white-box implementation of the final round differs from the white-box implementation of the other rounds. However, as the final round is not relevant for the cryptanalysis presented in this paper, the description of its implementation is omitted below.
First, the AddRoundKey and SubBytes operations of AES round r (1 ≤ r ≤ 9) are composed, resulting in 16 8-bit bijective lookup tables for each round. In the following, such a table is referred to as a T-box. If the 16 bytes of a 128 bit round key are denoted byk r i (i = 0, 1, . . . , 15), then the T-boxes are defined as follows:
T r i (x) = S(x ⊕k r i ) for 1 ≤ r ≤ 9 and 0 ≤ i ≤ 15 . Second, the 4 × 4 matrix MC is split into two 4 × 2 submatrices: MC 0 is defined as the first 2 columns of MC and MC 1 is defined as the remaining 2 columns of MC. Using this notation, the MixColumns matrix multiplication is given by: For 1 ≤ r ≤ 9, the T-boxes and the MixColumns operations are composed as depicted in Fig. 1 is a bijective linear mapping from 16 bits to 16 bits, i.e., it can be represented by a non-singular 16 × 16 matrix over GF (2) . Each white-box encoding R r i/2 is a bijective linear mapping from 32 bits to 32 bits, i.e., it can be represented by a non-singular 32 × 32 matrix over GF (2) . The resulting tables from 16 to 32 bits are referred to as TMC r i (i = 0, 1, . . . , 7) in the following.
Third, a 128 × 128 non-singular matrix M r over GF (2) is associated with each round r (1 ≤ r ≤ 9). If SR denotes the 128 × 128 non-singular matrix over GF (2) representing the ShiftRows operation, then the matrix M r is defined as follows:
for r = 2, 3, . . . , 9, where '•' denotes the function composition symbol. The matrix M 1 associated with the first round has a slightly different structure and is defined below.
Fourth, an additional secret white-box encoding is defined, denoted by IN. This encoding is represented by a non-singular 128 × 128 matrix over GF (2) , and is applied to an AES-128 plaintext. Next, the non-singular 128 × 128 matrix M 1 over GF (2) is defined as follows:
... Using these notations and definitions, the structure of the first 9 rounds of the white-box AES-128 implementation is depicted in Fig. 2 . In the white-box implementation, an operation M r is implemented as a matrix vector multiplication over GF (2) and an operation TMC r i is implemented as a look-up table. Notice that the output of two tables, which corresponds to the linearly encoded output of MC 0 and MC 1 , is added modulo two in the white-box implementation. After the final AES round, a secret white-box encoding OUT is applied to the AES-128 ciphertext. OUT is represented by a non-singular 128 × 128 matrix over GF (2) . Observe that, with the exception of the encodings IN and OUT, the white-box implementation of AES-128 is functionally equivalent to AES-128.
The main differences with the white-box AES-128 implementation presented in [4] are the following: (i) all secret white-box encodings are linear over GF (2) , and (ii) the secret white-box encodings operate on at least 2 bytes simultaneously instead of at least 4 bits (in case of a non-linear encoding) or at least a byte (in case of a linear encoding) in [4] . In [10] , the authors argue that their white-box AES-128 implementation is resistant against the BGE attack [1].
The Linear Equivalence Algorithm
Definition 1. Two permutations on n bits (or S-boxes) S 1 and S 2 are called linearly equivalent if a pair of linear mappings (A, B) from n to n bits exists such that
A pair (A, B) as in this definition is referred to as a linear equivalence. Notice that both linear mappings A and B of a linear equivalence are bijective. If S 1 = S 2 , then the linear equivalences are referred to as linear self-equivalences.
The linear equivalence problem is: given two n-bit bijective S-boxes S 1 and S 2 , determine if S 1 and S 2 are linearly equivalent. An algorithm for solving the linear equivalence problem is presented in [2] . The inputs to the algorithm are S 1 and S 2 , and the output is either a linear equivalence (A, B) in case S 1 and S 2 are linearly equivalent, or a message that such a linear equivalence does not exist. The algorithm is referred to as the linear equivalence algorithm (LE), and exploits the linearity of the mappings A and B. For an in depth description LE, refer to [2] . Below we give a brief description of a variant of LE where it is assumed that both given S-boxes map 0 to itself, i.e., S 1 (0) = S 2 (0) = 0. This variant of LE will be used as a building block for the cryptanalysis in this paper. In case S 1 (0) = S 2 (0) = 0, at least two guesses for two points of A are necessary in order to start LE; select two distinct input points x 1 = 0 and x 2 = 0 and guess the values of A(x 1 ) and A(x 2 ). Based on these two initial guesses and the linearity of A and B, we incrementally build the linear mappings A and B as far as possible. The initial guesses A(x i ) for the points x i (i = 1, 2) provide us with knowledge about B by computing y i = S 1 (A(x i )) and B(y i ) = S 2 (x i ), which in turn gives us possibly new information about A by computing the images of the linear combinations of y i and B(y i ) through respectively S 2 . This process is applied iteratively, where in each step of the process the linearity of the partially determined mappings A and B is verified by a Gaussian elimination. Figure 3 illustrates the process. In case neither for A nor for B a set of n linearly independent inputs and outputs is obtained, the algorithm requires an additional guess for a new point x of A (or B) in order to continue.
If n linearly independent inputs and n linearly independent outputs to A are obtained, then a candidate for A can be computed. Similar reasoning applies to B. If the candidate linear equivalence is denoted by (A * , B * ), then the correctness of this pair can be tested by verifying the relation S 2 = B * •S 1 •A * for all possible inputs. If no candidate linear equivalence is found (due to linear inconsistencies occurred during the process), or if the candidate linear equivalence is incorrect, then the process is repeated with a different guess for A(x 1 ) or for A(x 2 ), or for any of the possibly additional guesses made during the execution of LE.
The original linear equivalence algorithm LE exits after finding one single linear equivalence which already proves that both given S-boxes S 1 and S 2 are linearly equivalent. However, by running LE over all possible guesses, i.e., both initial guesses as well as the possibly additional guesses made during the execution of LE, also other linear equivalences (A, B) can be found. The work factor of this variant is at least n 3 · 2 2n , i.e., a Gaussian elimination (n 3 ) for each possible pair of initial guesses (2 2n ).
Cryptanalysis of the White-Box AES Implementation
In this section, we elaborate on the cryptanalysis of the white-box AES-128 implementation proposed in [10] and described in Sect. 2.2. The goal of the cryptanalysis is the recovery of the full 128-bit AES key, together with the external input and output encodings, IN and OUT respectively. The cryptanalysis focusses on extracting the first round keyk 1 contained within the 8 key-dependent 16-to-32 bit lookup tables TMC Fig. 4(a) , is defined as follows:
where denotes the concatenation symbol, ⊕ c denotes the function ⊕ c (x) = x ⊕ c, and S S denotes the 16-bit bijective S-box comprising two AES S-boxes in parallel. Given (3), the adversary knows that both S-boxes S 1 = S S and
As one can notice, only A is affine where the constant part equals the key-material contained within TMC bijective S-box S = S • ⊕ '52' where S denotes the AES S-box, then:
where S S denotes the 16-bit bijective S-box comprising two S-boxes S in parallel.
The key-independent 16-to-32 bit lookup table TMC 1 i is depicted in Fig. 4(b) .
Proof. Given the fact that TMC 
In the rare case that x i 0 = 0, it immediately follows that both first round key bytesk 
The 8-bit bijective S-box S maps 0 to itself, i.e. S('00') = '00', since S('52') = '00'. Given (4), it also follows that TMC
Linear Equivalence Algorithm (LE). Given (4), the adversary knows that the 16-bit bijective S-box S 1 = S S and the key-independent 16-to-32 bit lookup table S 2 = TMC Since in this case both S-boxes S 1 = S S and S 2 = TMC 1 i map 0 to itself, at least two initial 16-bit guesses A(x n ) for two distinct points x n = 0 (n = 1, 2) of A are necessary to execute LE, and hence the work factor becomes at least 2 44 , i.e., n 3 · 2 2n for n = 16. Furthermore, 128 linear equivalences (A, 
The desired linear equivalence, i.e., the linear equivalence that the adversary wants to obtain, is denoted by
• MC i mod 2 ) and corresponds to the one with the linear self-equivalence (A s , B s ) = (I 16 , I 16 ), where I 16 denotes the 16-bit identity matrix over GF (2).
Our Goal. In the following sections, we present a way how to modify the linear equivalence algorithm when applied to S 1 = S S and S 2 = TMC 
is given as output. At the same time, the work factor decreases as well. This modification exploits both the structure of AES as well as the structure of the white-box implementation.
Obtain Leaked Information about the Linear Input Encoding L 1 i
Due to the inherent structure of the white-box implementation, partial information about the linear input encoding L between U and V is given by mc S MC = {('02', '03'), ('01', '02'), ('01', '01'), ('03', '01')} .
Then, the 16-byte input to M 2 is provided as follows: three 4-byte 0-values for columns j = i * /2 (in our example: j = 0, 1, 3) and the 4-byte output of l between the bytes u 0 , u 1 of U , which is defined as:
where z = i * mod 2. This function follows out of the equation mc z l,0 ⊗ S(u 0 ) ⊕ mc z l,1 ⊗ S(u 1 ) = '00' and is depicted in Fig. 6 . Now, for the linear input encoding L Fig. 6 . How the known bijective function f i * l between u0 and u1 is defined.
Then, for each set S i * l , store the 16-bit value x, given as input to TMC 16 . This results in that each set S i * l is composed of 2 8 16-bit encoded values x for which the underlying unencoded bytes u 0 , u 1 share the known bijective function f i * l given by (7) and depicted in Fig. 6 : , '03' ). We choose one of both sets and simply denote it by S i . Now, select two distinct points x n = 0 (n = 1, 2) out of the chosen set, i.e., x n ∈ S i . Based on definition (8) of S i , these points are defined as
, where f i denotes the known function associated with S i . Now, based on this knowledge and the fact that we want to find A = L 1 i , the two initial guesses A(x n ) are made as follows: A(x n ) = a n f i (a n ) for all a n ∈ GF 2 8 \ {0} (n = 1, 2). Hence although A(x n ) is a 16-bit value, we only need to guess the 8-bit value a n such that the total number of guesses becomes 2 16 (i.e. 2 2 n 2 with n = 16). For each possible pair of initial guesses A(x n ) = a n f i (a n ) n=1,2 , LE is executed on S 1 = S S and S 2 = TMC 1 i . All found linear equivalences are stored in the set S LE .
It is assumed that at least (
• MC i mod 2 ) ∈ S LE , which occurs when a n = u n for n = 1, 2. It is possible that one or more linear equiv-
with A s = I 16 (see the introducing part of Sect. 3) can be found as well such that |S LE | > 1. In that case, the procedure needs to be repeated for two new distinct points x * n = 0 (n = 1, 2) out of the chosen set S i , which are also distinct from the original chosen points x n = 0 (n = 1, 2). This results in a second set S * LE . Assuming that all possible linear equivalences between S 1 = S S and
, it can be shown that for both considered sets, it is impossible that a linear equivalence with A s = I 16 is given as output during both executions of the procedure. Hence taking the intersection of both sets S LE and S * LE results in the desired linear equivalence (A, B) d . Algorithm 1 gives a detailed description of the whole procedure. It has an average case work factor of 2 29 , i.e., 2 · n 3 · 2 2 n 2 for n = 16.
Algorithm 1 Finding the desired linear equivalence (A, B) d
Input: S1 = S S, S2 = TMC
call search-LE(x * 1 , x * 2 ) → S * LE 
. By doing so for each table TMC 1 i (i = 0, 1, . . . , 7) and taking into account the data flow of the white-box implementation of the first round, the adversary is able to obtain the full 128-bit first round keyk 1 , which after applying the inverse ShiftRows operation to it results in the actual first round key k 1 . According to the AES key scheduling algorithm, k 1 corresponds to the 128-bit AES key k. k (e i ))))) = OUT(e i ) .
As one can notice, y i corresponds to the image of e i under the external 128-bit linear output encoding OUT. Hence OUT is completely defined by calculating all pairs (e i , y i ) for i = 0, . . . , 127.
Work Factor
The overall work factor of our cryptanalysis is dominated by the execution of Algorithm 1 in order to obtain the linear input encodings L 
Conclusion
This paper described in detail a practical attack on the white-box AES implementation of Xiao and Lai [10] . The cryptanalysis exploits both the structure of AES as well as the structure of the white-box AES implementation. It uses a modified variant of the linear equivalence algorithm presented by Biryukov et al. [2] , which is built by exploiting leaked information out of the white-box implementation. The attack efficiently extracts the AES key from Xiao et al.'s white-box AES implementation with a work factor of about 2 32 . In addition to extracting the AES key, which is the main goal in cryptanalysis of white-box implementations, our cryptanalysis is also able to recover the external input and output encodings. Crucial parts of the cryptanalysis have been implemented in C++ and verified by computer experiments. The implementation furthermore shows that both the 128-bit AES key as well as the external input and output encodings can be extracted from the white-box implementation in just a few minutes on a modern PC.
